



THE AUTHORITY OF THE "PROVISIONAL COURT"
OF LOUISIANA.
In the early part of this Volume (p. 66), a statement was given
of the recent organization of a Provisional Court for the state
of Louisiana, by authority of the President of the United States.
The extent of the jurisdiction thus created, and the validity of
the decrees pronounced by Judge PEABODY, under his commis-
sion, present questions of novelty as well as interest. Has a
judicial or simply-a military tribunal been created? Are its
judgments of permanent or temporary force ? Are they conclu-
sive upon the rights of parties, or re-examinable by other courts ?
As Commander-in-Chief of the Army and Navy of the United
States, the President has the right to declare the existence of
martial law over territory disputed by armed opposition to the
national authority, when and where he deems it necessary. And
he has equally the right to delegate to any subordinate the power
of expounding that law, which the Duke of Wellington defined
as the will of the military commander.
This will is ordinarily expressed only as acting upon the rights
of persons, unless where property is taken for public use, and it
is doubtful if more than this is to be included under the term
Iartial Law, as understood in constitutional governments.
During its continuance, however, this will of the military com-
mander may evidently extend itself, at his pleasure, to cover and
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determine all rights of private property and civil controversies,
for he represents the force of the state unfettered by its laws.
But when the exigency has passed, and the civil authority
resumes its sway, these private rights would be decided, in
general, without regard to prior military adjudications. Martial
law, when pushed to this extent, is the law of the moment and
the bayonet. Its stability is limited by the one ; its authority by
the other.
By a military order of the President of the United States,
certified by the Secretary of War under the seal of that depart-
ment, the Hon. Charles A. Peabody, of New York, was commis-
sioned to hold "a Provisional Court, which shall be a court of
record for the state of Louisiana, with authority to hear, try,
and determine all causes, civil and criminal, including causes in
law, equity, revenue and admiralty, and particularly all such
powers and jurisdiction as belong to the District and Circuit
Courts of the United States, conforming his proceedings, so far
as possible, to the course of proceedings and practice which has
been customary in the courts of the United States and Louisiana-
his judgment to be final and conclusive."
Thus, by a paper dashed off in a few hurried moments (for its
tautology and inaccuracy of construction show that it was drawn
up with little deliberation), one man, acting on powers given him,
at most, only by implication, confers on another all the judicial
authority over an extensive territory which could be granted by
the sovereign power of a state.
The criminal jurisdiction granted would seem to be authorized,
and the sentences pronounced under it conclusive, for every
breach of the peace is an offence against the military, here the
governing power; and the offender, therefore, is justly liable to
punishment by its officers.
'The civil jurisdiction exercised, however, whether terminating
in judgments in rem or in personam, seems not entitled to the
same protection. If two men differ about the title to a horse or
a farm, the necessity of the case does not call upon the military
commander to intervene. So long as their difference does not
lead them to break the peace, the military power can only inter-
fere as a matter of temporary policy. If the legislative power
does not see fit to give such complainants a mode of remedy, it
is because it thinks it best, in such times, that they should remain
remediless ; and the executive cannot make permanent laws, or
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give permanent effect to his own temporary law, under a consti-
tution, defining a'nd separating, as does ours, the Executive, Leg-
islative, and Judicial Departments.
An instructive case upon this point is that of Jecker et al. vs.
Montgomery, 13 How. 498. During the Mexican War, it was
inconvenient to send home for adjudication the prizes captured
by our naval cruisers on the Pacific coast. At the request of the
naval commander on that station, the President of the United
States erected a Prize Court at Moiiterey, a port of the enemy
in our possession, and appointed a chaplain from one of the ships
of war to act as judge, and exercise admiralty jurisdiction in
cases of capture, reporting his proceedings tb and holding all
prize-moneys for distribution upon the order of the Secretary of
the Navy.
A captured vessel having been condemned and sold under pro-
ceedings before this court, the owners of the cargo brought their
action to recover its value, against the commander of the ship
making the seizure, before a District Court of the United States.
In giving the opinion of the Supreme Court, before which the
case came on appeal, TANEY, C. J., remarks: "Under the Con-
stitution of the United States, the judicial power of the General
Government is vested in one Supreme Court, and in such inferior
courts as Congress shall from time to time ordain and establish.
Every court of the United States, therefore, must derive its juris-
diction and judicial authority from the Constitution or the laws
of the United States ; and neither the President nor any military
officer can establish a court in a conquered country, and authorize
it to decide upon the rights of the United States, or of individu-
als in prize cases, nor to administer the laws of nations.
-Th6 courts established or sanctioned in Mexico during the war,
by the commanders of the American forces, were nothing more
than the agents of the military power, to assist it in preserving
order in the conquered territory, and to protect the inhabitants
in their persons and property, while it was occupied by the
American arms. They were subject to the military power, and
their decisions under its control, whenever the commanding
officer thought proper to interfere. They were not courts of the
United States, and had no right to adjudicate upon a question of
prize or on prize; and the sentence of condemnation in the court
of Monterey is a nullity, and can have no effect upon the rights
of any party."
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An equally unanswerable argument against the judicial cha-
racter of the Provisional Court is drawn from the tenure of office
of the judge who holds it. See the opinion of MARSHALL, 0. J.,
•in Am. Insurance Co. vs. Canter, 1 Pet. 546.
The doctrine of these cases applies to the civil adjudications of
Judge PEABODY with a double force. In the state of Louisiana,
Congress had actually established what it deemed proper and suffi-
cient judicial tribunals. The presiding justice of that circuit (Judge
CATRON) was, when this Provisional Court was established, in the
active performance of his judicial duties at the seat of govern-
ment. The places of the district judges, if they had become for-
feited, could easily have been filled upon proper proceedings;
yet, by a stroke of the pen, these established courts are either
ousted of their jurisdiction, or forced to share it with a tribunal
unknown to the laws, and at least one case (that of The Barkc
Grapeshot) is in fact transferred from the Circuit Court, to which
it had come on appeal from the District Court for the Eastern
District of Louisiana, to this Provisional Court, and there brought
to final judgment.
What is this, if considered a judicial proceeding, but the sub-
stitution of a court of the Executive for a court of the Constitu-
tion ? and what is that but the substitution of arbitrary power for
constitutional limitations ?
The Constitution, we may admit, allows the President under
certain circumstances to silence all law in a given district and
rule it by his military will. But surely it does not allow him to
withdraw causes from courts whose legal existence and present
authority he recognises by the withdrawal, to be decided by him-
self or his agents, and claim for such decision the sanctions of
permanent judicial determinations.
There is less doubt about the remaining civil jurisdiction
bestowed upon the Provisional Court, that of causes properly
cognisable in the state courts. This, not even Congress,
and much less the President, could permanently vest in other
tribunals, since the authority granted to the United States does
not embrace it. When conferred upon this military officer, it
was as a temporary measure of military policy, the better to pre-
serve the order and contentment of the community. The attach-
ment to the forms and sanctions of judicial tribunals, as De
Tocqueville has remarked, is a deep-fixed sentiment of the Ameri-
can people. If, during a temporary disorganization of civil
HeinOnline  -- 13 Am. L. Reg. 388 November 1864 to November 1865
PROVISIONAL COURT OF LOUISIANA.
government, justice must be declared by the voice of military
command, our people like better to have it uttered by one bearing
the appellation of judge and acting by a marshal, clerk, and dis-
trict attorney-names of familiar authority-than by an officer
in uniform with a file of soldiers to enforce his decisions. And
so, from a similar policy, in many of our detached military posts,
the commanders have created provost-marshal's courts (as, for
example, " The Provost-]Marshal's Court for the District of, New-
bern"), to which writs in ordinary form are returned by an officer
styled,, Constable of the Court."
If these views are correct, it would follow that the civil rights
of parties, upon the cessation of military government, are to be
regarded as tinaffected by decisions of the Provisional Courts.
As was said by Chief Justice MARSHALL in Bose vs. Eimely, 4
Cranch 241, in reviewing a judgment in rem pronounced by a
prize court in San Domingo, " a sentence professing on its face
to be the sentence of a judicial tribunal, if rendered by a self-
constituted body, or by a body not empowered by its government
to take cognisance of the subject it had decided, could have no
legal effect whatever. The power of the court then is, of neces-
sity, examinable to a certain extent by that tribunal which is
compelled to decide whether its sentence has changed the right
of property. The power under which it acts must be looked
into; and its authority to decide questions which it professes to
decide must be considered."
The principle which protects adjudications by the courts of a
defacto government (as, in England, the judgments of the courts
of 'Cromwell's Protectorate were respected upon the Restoration),
will not apply in the case in hand, since we have to deal not with
a judicial but with a military tribunal. Judge PEABODY'S court
would probably be entitled to less regard than a court-martial of
tfie ordinary character. Neither would be protected if acting
without its legal jurisdiction.
, To give any binding effect to a judgment, it is essential that
the court should have jurisdiction of the person and of the subject-
matter, and the want of jurisdiction is a matter that may always
be set up against a judgment when sought to be enforced, or
where any benefit is claimed under it. The want of jurisdiction
makes it utterly void and unavailable for any purpose :" Borden
vs. Fitch, 15 Johns. 141; Dynes vs. Hoover, 20 How. 83.
The reorganization of the state and national courts for Louis-
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iana, recently effected, has superseded the functions of Judge
PEABODY, by the terms of his commission, and he descends from
the bench to take the place of United States District Attorney.
We shall look with interest to see whether the equity of the
judgments of the Provisional Court and their apparent necessity
will induce his successors to respect and uphold them, or whether
the rule will be followed, which is indicated in Jecker vs. font-
gomery, and the gates of litigation thrown open anew. B.
New Haven, Conn., February, 1865.
RECENT AMERICAN DECISIONS.
Supreme Judicial Court of New Hampshire.
TOWN OF NEW MARKET VS. ROBERT SMART.
In a grant "to the inhabitants of a town, to be held by them as a body politic
and corporate, and to their successors for ever," the title vests in the town as a
corporation.
In the case of such grant made in 1803, to the use of the minister then settled
in the town of New Market, as long as he should be the settled Congregational
minister there; and then to be and remain for the use of the minister of that
persuasion that shall be settled in that town, the title rests in the town in its
parochial, and not in its municipal character.
Where the voluntary religious society which existed at the time of this grant,
and over which the minister referred to was settled, was afterwards under the
statute of July 3, 1827, organized and became a body corporate and politic,
capable of taking and holding real and personal estate for the use of the society;
and the town was no longer charged with any parochial duties in relation to
such society; held, that the legal, as well as beneficial, estate in the lands so
granted, passed to, and were vested in, that society, as the successor to the paro-
chial rights and duties formerly belonging to the town.
Where the cestui que trust in possession disavows the trust, and claims to hold
the land by a title hostile to that of the trustee; and this, by some clear and
unequivocal act, is distinctly brought to the knowledge of the trustee ; the pos-
session will from that time be deemed to be adverse.
In such a case it is not essential that the cestui que trust should claim an abso-
lute fee simple or freehold in himself, but it is sufficient if the title claimed be in
trust for the use of the ministry in a certain religious society for ever.
This is an action of trespass quare clausum fregit. The locus
in quo is in South New Market, and is known as the Parsonage.
The plaintiff claims under one Pike and others, who being seised
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